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Abstract  
Drawing on empirical observations of operation of public distribution system in different states of 
India, the paper constructs a preliminary game theoretic model. It argues that an effective public 
distribution must be as universal as possible, delivery mechanism of fair price shops should be re-
formed, they should be make them commercially viable and that special attention should be paid 
to PDS at times of high food inflation. 
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Introduction 
The Indian parliament passed the National 
Food Security Bill in 2013. The passage of the 
bill was preceded and accompanied by 
animated debates in academic and policy 
circles. It is important to note that public 
distribution system has been the topic of 
debates in India for long. One suspects that the 
degree of intensity of the debate considerably 
went up after 1997, when universal public 
distribution system (UPDS) was discarded in 
favour of targeted public distribution system 
(TPDS). Detractors of TPDS have pointed out 
that the move towards targeting has not 
succeeded in reducing price volatility. 
Furthermore, after TPDS has been introduced 
per capita food availability has gone down. It 
has become more unstable as well (Sen and 
Himanshu, 2011).  
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that discussions 
on many dimensions of the PDS went on as the 
food security bill was on its way. Probably these 
debates would continue, for the issues that 
underpin them are by no means settled. Some 
of the aspects of PDS which have been in 
discussion are introduction of cash transfer or 
coupons in lieu of food-in-kind, continuation of 
TPDS versus switching over to UPDS, extending 
the coverage of TPDS, identification of 
beneficiaries, introduction of “aadhar” cards 
which will collect biometric information of 
beneficiaries, non-traditional food security 
measures such as special provisions for 
lactating mothers, babies and the destitute. On 
each of these issues, different shades of 
opinion have circulated. For example, Kotwal et 
al. (2011) raised important points in favour of 
cash transfer, which may help in curbing 
corruption. Soares (2011) and Yanes (2011) 
discussed the phases which Brazil and Mexico 
went through while implementing targeted 
cash transfer. Svederberg (2012) like Kotwal et 
al. (2012) has argued for targeted cash transfer 
based on biometric identity validation, as it 
would curtail wasteful expenses. Khera (2011a) 
presents survey data of selected states of India 
pertaining to performance of PDS and argues 
that there are lessons one can learn from the 
states which have been successful in 
implementing PDS. Sen and Himanshu (2011) 
have presented the case for near-universal PDS 
whose costs according to them are not much 
higher than the existing system.  
The present article does not intend to cover all, 
or even a majority, of these evidently salient 
issues. The aim here is to consider some 
empirical observations pertaining to the public 
distribution system. The paper would try to 
understand the logic behind the functioning of 
PDS in places it has been running satisfactorily. 
This would hopefully provide us some lessons 
on designing a less corrupt system. We shall 
concentrate on the microeconomic aspects of 
public distribution system here. A model on the 
distribution of food in a strategic decision-
making framework (i.e., a game theoretic 
model) will be presented to understand the 
empirical observations. First, we shall discuss 
some prominent features of PDS as it has been 
functioning in different states of India. This 
would be useful to mould the basic contours of 
the model to be presented subsequently.  
Observations  
A notable observation of performance of PDS in 
India is that those states which are closer to 
universalising the PDS are more successful in 
delivering its benefits. In the nine states where 
Khera (2011a) conducted her survey four are 
either fully universal (Tamil Nadu and Himachal 
Pradesh) or quasi-universal (Chhattisgarh and 
Andhra Pradesh, where about 80 per cent of 
the population are entitled to PDS 
commodities). In a different paper, Khera 
(2011b) has categorised major states of India 
into three groups: functioning, reforming and 
languishing, based on per capita purchase of 
PDS grains. Except Chhattisgarh, which tops in 
the category of “reforming” states, the other 
three of the above four states are “functioning” 
states. In other words, these four states are 
among the top performers of the country. 
States with universal PDS are also known to 
have low leakage or diversion of PDS food (Sen 
and Himanshu, 2011). A reason for this could 
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be that in UPDS everyone has a stake in the 
smooth functioning of PDS, because everyone 
is a potential or actual beneficiary (Basu and 
Das, 2013). For those officials and traders who 
are in between the release of food from 
government godowns and the actual point of 
sale, pilferage of PDS goods becomes difficult 
when the number of stakeholders rises. In 
TPDS, not everyone is a beneficiary. A large 
number of people do not have the incentive to 
keep it functional. This could be one of the 
possible explanations for the observed negative 
relation between universalisation and 
corruption. There might be others.  
Second, to make the system functional the fair 
price shops (FPS), where PDS goods are 
distributed, should be commercially viable. 
After TPDS was introduced, the volume of grain 
handled by the fair price shops has gone down. 
The number of beneficiaries has also declined. 
Both these factors have adversely affected the 
earning of the dealer. It has been found that 
this has contributed to pilferage and diversion 
of PDS food to open market. In Khera’s (2011a) 
survey the states where commission of the 
dealer has not been revised (Bihar, UP, 
Jharkhand) are some of the worst PDS 
performers. It thus appears that giving the 
dealer an economic incentive could be helpful. 
The third observation is regarding monitoring. 
It has been found that the states which are 
more vigilant have less corruption. This is an 
obvious point which needs little elaboration. 
One may however note some features of 
pilferage. It is observed that the largest part of 
PDS grain diversion takes place between the 
lifting of the stock from Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) godowns and the FPS. When the 
dealer is responsible for lifting the stock the 
chances of diversion rises. This is the reason 
why many states have taken over the 
responsibility of delivering the stock to the FPS. 
In such cases corruption has gone down. 
Corruption has also reduced when innovative 
ways to plug the leaks have been experimented 
and applied. Some of these include institutional 
changes such as running the FPS by cooperative 
societies instead of private shop owners. Or it 
could be the use of information technology, 
such as informing the beneficiaries directly 
through SMS via mobile phones about the 
availability of stock in the FPS (Khera, 2011a).  
A Model  
Collating the observations noted above we 
construct a schematic model. This is a simple 
game theoretic model involving two parties (or 
players, as they are called in game theory). We 
are constructing an extensive game, where the 
players take their action one after another in a 
sequential manner. The two players are: (1) the 
dealer in the FPS, denoted by D, (2) the 
beneficiary who is entitled to PDS commodities 
(let us suppose foodgrain), denoted by B. 
Besides these two players, there is a third 
party, the government, denoted by G. We are 
keeping this model simple, therefore G is not 
assumed to be a player. In other words, it does 
not take strategic decisions, nor does it get any 
payoff from the game. G randomly fixes some 
value of a variable (elaborated below) in a 
random manner. In game theory literature 
Nature is often assigned such roles.  
We assume that variable which G decides in the 
beginning of the game is α. α is the proportion 
of the population of the country (or state) 
entitled to buy foodgrain at a rate cheaper than 
the open market price. α can take any value 
from 0 and 1, including the two limits. When α 
= 1 PDS is universal. α = 0 would mean 
complete dismantling of PDS in its present 
form. 0 < α < 1 implies TPDS.  
After G has decided on a particular α, it sends 
corresponding amount of foodgrain to the fair 
price shops. We are considering the behaviour 
of a representative of these shops. The dealer 
of this shop is denoted by D. The game has now 
moved to stage 2, where it is the turn of D to 
decide what proportion of foodgrain 
entitlement he will divert, and sell in the open 
market. Let us assume that each beneficiary 
who is entitled to PDS foodgrain is entitled to F 
amount of foodgrain. D decides a proportion, 
let us say β, of F which he would actually sell to 
the beneficiary. Like α, β ranges between 0 and 
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1. β = 0 would imply complete corruption. β = 1 
would mean zero corruption.  
To avoid complications, the quality of grain 
distributed through PDS is assumed to be same 
as those available in open market. Once D has 
decided a particular β, it means that B would 
get β.F food in the FPS, instead of his legal 
entitlement F. B has two choices, either to 
purchase it (the action is denoted by P), or not 
to purchase it (denoted by NP). Since the 
quality of PDS grain is same as that of open 
market, a consumer when offered β.F of PDS 
grain would take it because the price in FPS is 
lower. Thus there would not be any excess 
unsold supply of PDS grain. It also means that 
given β > 0, B in our model would always 
choose P.1   
As the choice made by the beneficiary is trivial 
here, we ignore it in the graphical 
representation of the game below (Figure 1). 
The payoff of the FPS dealer, D, is of special 
interest. His payoffs are β.F.π1+ (1 – 
β)[F.π3(1 –p) – p.c] and (1 – β)[F.π3(1 – p) 
– p.c] in the diagram. We elaborate them 
below. 
The payoff (or utility) of D assumed to be linear 
in the money he earns. This also implies that 
that D is risk neutral, a convenient assumption 
for this simple exposition. Let us denote his 
payoff function by Ud. The profit he makes by 
selling a unit of PDS grain to B is π1. If he diverts 
this to open market, profit per unit rises to π3 
(π1 < π3). However selling PDS grain in the open 
market is a risky business and may attract 
punishment. The punishment may be meted 
out by the government. It could be more social 
in nature as well— social boycott for example. 
The magnitude of punishment when D is caught 
is given by c. Besides paying this fine, D loses 
the opportunity of making profit by selling the 
PDS grain. The stock he had assigned for sale in 
open market, (1 – β)F, is confiscated. Let us 
                                                 
1An alternative justification could be as follows. Although 
the quality of PDS grain could be low compared to those 
available in open market at a higher price, the 
representative beneficiary B does not have the 
wherewithal to purchase the latter. Thus he buys β.F 
even when it is not of the best quality. 
assume that the probability that the dealer is 
found out is given by p. Being a number 
representing probability, p lies between 0 and 
1. We make the important assumption that p is 
a non-decreasing function of α. It is also 
assumed to be a function of t, where t 
represents anti-corruption measures such as 
switching over to cooperative society managed 
FPS, SMS alerts etc. Thus,  
[1] p = g (α, t), where    
[1] implies when more people have stake in the 
PDS (high α) it is easier to detect the corrupt 
dealer.  
With the help of the assumptions made so far, 
we can write the payoff function of D, when B 
decides to purchase what D sells in the FPS, as, 
[2] Ud  = β.F.π1 + (1 – β) [F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c] 
The explanation is as follows. Since D has 
decided to sell β.F through FPS and π1 is the 
profit per unit, the first term in [2] is the profit 
from sale through FPS. By selling (1 – β) of F in 
open market, D is entering an uncertain 
situation. With probability (1 – p), he makes per 
unit profit of π3. However, with probability p 
fine c is imposed. The terms in square brackets 
in [2] represent the expected payoff when F 
amount of food is diverted. This is multiplied 
with (1 – β) because that is the proportion of F 
which is diverted. 
When the consumer does not purchase FPS 
grain, the allotment assigned for FPS 
distribution (i.e., βF) is taken back. Thus, the 
first part becomes zero. D still earns money by 
diverting a part of the allotment. So, his payoff 
here is, 
[3] Ud  = (1 – β) [F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c]  
Given that the beneficiary chooses P in 
equilibrium, [3] becomes irrelevant. In short, 
the dealer would concentrate on [2] and try to 
maximise it by choosing an appropriate β. 
Notice that [2] is the weighted average of F.π1 
and F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c with the weights β and 
(1 – β). This implies that if  
[4] F.π1 > F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c  
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D would choose β = 1. If,  
[5] F.π1 <  F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c  
D would set β = 0. If,  
[6] F.π1 = F.π3 (1 –p) – p.c 
any value of β is optimal.  
If the profit of selling the food entitlement 
through FPS is higher than the expected payoff 
of diverting it, the dealer does not divert any 
part of it: β = 1, or zero corruption. If the latter 
is greater than the former, he diverts all of it: β 
= 0, complete corruption. If the two are equal, 
he is indifferent between selling through FPS or 
diverting.  
This simple model gives us corner solutions. 
That is, the dealer either diverts fully or he does 
not divert at all. In the third case he may divert 
partially (case [6]). But this would occur in a 
rare coincidence when F.π1 = F.π3 (1 –p) – 
p.c. 
In spite of economy of results, the model has 
interesting and intuitive implications. As p or c 
rises the expected payoff of diverting falls. As a 
result, the payoff from sales through FPS may 
become higher, so case [4] becomes likely, 
corruption may fall. We recall that by [1] 
probability of detection tends to rise as 
proportion of people in PDS entitlement rises. 
Hence our model reflects the observation that 
greater universalisation implies less diversion of 
PDS grains.  
Profit margins in FPS and open market are also 
found to be important. A high π1, ceteris 
paribus, would go towards satisfaction of [4], 
implying no diversion. This is in line with the 
observation that financial viability of the PDS 
outlets is critical for a well-functioning PDS. We 
further observe that rising π3 may allure the 
dealer towards diversion. Times of high food 
inflation are thus times of vulnerability for PDS.  
Conclusion  
The debate over public distribution system has 
taken many dimensions in recent decades. 
Although interesting arguments have been 
advanced from different sides, field studies 
suggest that delivering food through PDS is not 
as unviable a proposition as it is often made out 
to be. Many states have experimented with 
innovative measures which have proved to be 
successful. These include institutional changes, 
such as replacing the model of private shop 
owners with cooperative societies running the 
FPS. Or, by making use of technology such as 
mobile phones, which enhances the access of 
information of the beneficiary. In general, it 
appears that greater coverage of PDS has a 
salutary effect on the degree of corruption. The 
model presented here tries to capture these 
realities through a schematic model. Aside from 
extending the coverage of PDS, which is the 
first policy implication, the model cautions us 
about the fragility of the PDS at times when 
food price in open market is high. For the last 
few years food price inflation in India has been 
above 10 per cent per annum mark. Apart from 
exerting pressure on the living conditions of 
people whose income does not move with 
prices, high inflation may render PDS 
vulnerable. The second important policy 
implication therefore is that there is an urgent 
requirement to fix the PDS at times of high 
inflation. The third implication is the emphasis 
on the commercial viability of FPS. Low profits 
of distributing PDS foodgrain may allure many 
private shop owners to look for easy bucks 
through diversion. Until an alternative system 
of distribution is put in place matters of 
commercial incentive for the private shop 
owners cannot be overlooked. Finally, but very 
importantly, the element of monitoring is 
underscored. Monitoring can be achieved 
through institutional overhauls, for example, 
empowering the local community to oversee 
the functioning of PDS (this is related to the 
first point of extending the coverage; without 
ensuring greater participation of people at the 
grass roots simply extending PDS coverage may 
breed corruption). Monitoring could also be 
attained by taking the help of technology. Both 
these considerations should mould public 
policy.  
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